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String data are often disseminated to support applications such as location-based service provision or DNA se-
quence analysis. This dissemination, however, may expose sensitive patterns that model confidential knowl-
edge (e.g., trips to mental health clinics from a string representing a user’s location history). In this article,
we consider the problem of sanitizing a string by concealing the occurrences of sensitive patterns, while
maintaining data utility, in two settings that are relevant to many common string processing tasks.
In the first setting, we aim to generate the minimal-length string that preserves the order of appearance
and frequency of all non-sensitive patterns. Such a string allows accurately performing tasks based on the
sequential nature and pattern frequencies of the string. To construct such a string, we propose a time-optimal
algorithm, TFS-ALGO. We also propose another time-optimal algorithm, PFS-ALGO, which preserves a par-
tial order of appearance of non-sensitive patterns but produces a much shorter string that can be analyzed
more efficiently. The strings produced by either of these algorithms are constructed by concatenating non-
sensitive parts of the input string. However, it is possible to detect the sensitive patterns by “reversing” the
concatenation operations. In response, we propose a heuristic, MCSR-ALGO, which replaces letters in the
strings output by the algorithms with carefully selected letters, so that sensitive patterns are not reinstated,
implausible patterns are not introduced, and occurrences of spurious patterns are prevented. In the second
setting, we aim to generate a string that is at minimal edit distance from the original string, in addition to
preserving the order of appearance and frequency of all non-sensitive patterns. To construct such a string,
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we propose an algorithm, ETFS-ALGO, based on solving specific instances of approximate regular expression
matching.
We implemented our sanitization approach that applies TFS-ALGO, PFS-ALGO, and then MCSR-ALGO,
and experimentally show that it is effective and efficient. We also show that TFS-ALGO is nearly as effective
at minimizing the edit distance as ETFS-ALGO, while being substantially more efficient than ETFS-ALGO.
CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy → Data anonymization and sanitization; • Mathematics of
computing → Combinatorics on words;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Data privacy, data sanitization, knowledge hiding, sequences, strings,
sensitive knowledge
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1 INTRODUCTION
A large number of applications, in domains ranging from transportation to web analytics and
bioinformatics feature data modeled as strings, i.e., sequences of letters over some finite alpha-
bet. For instance, a string may represent the history of visited locations of one or more individu-
als, with each letter corresponding to a location. Similarly, it may represent the history of search
query terms of one or more web users, with letters corresponding to query terms, or a medically
important part of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequence of a patient, with letters correspond-
ing to DNA bases. Analyzing such strings is key in applications including location-based service
provision, product recommendation, and DNA sequence analysis. Therefore, such strings are of-
ten disseminated beyond the party that has collected them. For example, location-based service
providers often outsource their data to data analytics companies who perform tasks such as sim-
ilarity evaluation between strings [30], and retailers outsource their data to marketing agencies
who perform tasks such as mining frequent patterns from the strings [31].
However, disseminating a string intact may result in the exposure of confidential knowledge,
such as trips to mental health clinics in transportation data [48], query terms revealing political
beliefs or sexual orientation of individuals in web data [38], or diseases associated with certain
parts of DNA data [34]. Thus, it may be necessary to sanitize a string prior to its dissemination, so
that confidential knowledge is not exposed. At the same time, it is important to preserve the utility
of the sanitized string, so that data protection does not outweigh the benefits of disseminating the
string to the party that disseminates or analyzes the string, or to the society at large. For example,
a retailer should still be able to obtain actionable knowledge in the form of frequent patterns from
the marketing agency who analyzed their outsourced data; and researchers should still be able to
perform analyses such as identifying significant patterns in DNA sequences.
1.1 Our Model and Settings
Motivated by the discussion above, we introduce the following model which we call Combinatorial
String Dissemination (CSD). In CSD, a party has a stringW that it seeks to disseminate, while satis-
fying a set of constraints and a set of desirable properties. For instance, the constraints aim to cap-
ture privacy requirements and the properties aim to capture data utility considerations (e.g., posed
by some other party based on applications). To satisfy both, W must be transformed to a string
by applying a sequence of edit operations. The computational task is to determine this sequence
of edit operations so that the transformed string satisfies the desirable properties subject to the
constraints. Clearly, the constraints and the properties must be specified based on the application.
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Under the CSD model, we consider two specific settings addressing practical considerations in
common string processing applications: the Minimal String Length (MSL) setting, in which the goal
is to produce a shortest string that satisfies the set of constraints and the set of desirable properties,
and the Minimal Edit Distance (MED) setting, in which the goal is to produce a string that satisfies
the set of constraints and the set of desirable properties and is at MED fromW . In the following,
we discuss each setting in more detail.
MSL Setting. In this setting, the sanitized string X must satisfy the following constraint C1: for
an integer k > 0, no given length-k substring (also called pattern) modeling confidential knowl-
edge should occur in X . We call each such length-k substring a sensitive pattern. We aim at finding
the shortest possible stringX satisfying the following desired properties: (P1) the order of appear-
ance of all other length-k substrings (non-sensitive patterns) is the same inW and inX ; and (P2) the
frequency of these length-k substrings is the same inW and in X . The problem of constructing X
in this setting is referred to as Total order, Frequency, Sanitization (TFS). Note that it is straightfor-
ward to hide substrings of arbitrary lengths fromX , by setting k equal to the length of the shortest
substring we wish to hide, and then setting, for each of these substrings, any length-k substring
as sensitive.
The MSL setting is motivated by real-world applications involving string dissemination. In these
applications, a data custodian disseminates the sanitized version X of a string W to a data recip-
ient, for the purpose of analysis (e.g., mining). W contains confidential information that the data
custodian needs to hide, so that it does not occur in X . Such information is specified by the data
custodian based on domain expertise, as in [1, 13, 25, 31]. At the same time, the data recipient
specifies P1 and P2 that X must satisfy in order to be useful. These properties map directly to
common data utility considerations in string analysis. By satisfying P1, X allows tasks based on
the sequential nature of the string, such as blockwise q-gram distance computation [26], to be
performed accurately. By satisfying P2, X allows computing the frequency of length-k substrings
and hence mining frequent length-k substrings [41] with no utility loss. We require that X has
minimal length so that it does not contain redundant information. For instance, the string which
is constructed by concatenating all non-sensitive length-k substrings in W and separating them
with a special letter that does not occur inW , satisfies P1 and P2 but is not the shortest possible.
Such a string X will have a negative impact on the efficiency of any subsequent analysis tasks to
be performed on it.
MED Setting. In this setting, the sanitized versionXED of stringW must satisfy the properties P1
and P2, subject to the constraint C1, and also be at MED from stringW . Constructing such a string
XED allows many tasks that are based on edit distance to be performed accurately. Examples of
such tasks are frequent pattern mining [44], clustering [28], entity extraction [51] and range query
answering [33], which are important in domains such as bioinformatics [44], text mining [51], and
speech recognition [20].
Note, existing works for sequential data sanitization (e.g., [13, 25, 27, 31, 50]) or anonymization
(e.g., [4, 14, 17]) cannot be applied to our settings (see Section 2 for details).
1.2 Our Contributions
We define the TFS problem for string sanitization and a variant of it, referred to as Partial order,
Frequency, Sanitization (PFS), which aims at producing an even shorter string Y by relaxing P1 of
TFS. We also develop algorithms for TFS and PFS. Our algorithms construct strings X and Y using
a separator letter #, which is not contained in the alphabet ofW , ensuring that sensitive patterns
do not occur in X or Y . The algorithms repeat proper substrings of sensitive patterns so that the
frequency of non-sensitive patterns overlapping with sensitive ones does not change. For X , we
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give a deterministic construction which may be easily reversible (i.e., it may enable a data recipient
to constructW fromX ), because the occurrences of # reveal the exact location of sensitive patterns.
ForY , we give a construction which breaks several ties arbitrarily, thus being less easily reversible.
We further address the reversibility issue by defining the Minimum-Cost Separators Replacement
(MCSR) problem and designing an algorithm for dealing with it. In MCSR, we seek to replace all
separators, so that the location of sensitive patterns is not revealed, while preserving data utility.
In addition, we define the problem of constructing XED in the MED setting, which is referred to as
Edit-distance, Total order, Frequency, Sanitization (ETFS), and design an algorithm framework to
solve it.
Our work makes the following specific contributions:
1. We design an algorithm, TFS-ALGO, for solving the TFS problem in O (kn) time, where n is the
length ofW . In fact, we prove that O (kn) time is worst-case optimal by showing that the length of
X is in Θ(kn) in the worst case. The output of TFS-ALGO is a string X consisting of a sequence of
substrings over the alphabet of W separated by # (see Example 1.1 below). An important feature
of our algorithm, which is useful in the efficient construction of Y discussed next, is that it can be
implemented to produce an O (n)-sized representation of X with respect to W in O (n) time. See
Section 4.
Example 1.1. Let W = aabaaacbcbbbaabbacaab, k = 4, and the set of sensitive patterns be
{baaa, bbaa}. The string X = aabaa#aaacbcbbba#baabbacaab consists of three substrings over
the alphabet {a, b, c} separated by #. Note that no sensitive pattern occurs in X , while all non-
sensitive substrings of length k = 4 have the same frequency in W and in X (e.g., aaba appears
once), and they appear in the same order inW and in X (e.g., aaba precedes abaa). Also, note that
any shorter string than X would either create sensitive patterns or change the frequencies (e.g.,
removing the last letter of X creates a string in which caab no longer appears).
2. We define the PFS problem relaxing P1 of TFS to produce shorter strings that are more efficient
to analyze. Instead of a total order (P1), we require a partial order (Π1) that preserves the order
of appearance only for sequences of consecutive non-sensitive length-k substrings that overlap
by k − 1 letters. In other words, Π1 requires preserving the order of appearance of any two non-
sensitive length-k substringsU ,V for which the following two conditions hold: (I)U andV occur
consecutively inW , and (II) the length-(k − 1) suffix of U is the same as the length-(k − 1) prefix
of V . This makes sense because the order of two consecutive non-sensitive length-k substrings
with no length-(k − 1) overlap has anyway been “interrupted” (by one or more sensitive patterns).
We exploit this observation to shorten the string further. Specifically, we design an algorithm
that solves PFS in the optimal O (n + |Y |) time, where |Y | is the length of Y , using the O (n)-sized
representation of X . See Section 5.
Example 1.2 (Cont’d from Example 1.1). Recall thatW =aabaaacbcbbbaabbacaab. A string Y is
aaacbcbbba#aabaabbacaab. The order of aaba and abaa is preserved in Y as they are consec-
utive, non-sensitive, and the length-3 suffix of aaba is the same as the length-3 prefix of abaa
(i.e., they have an overlap of k−1=3 letters). The order of abaa and aaac, which are consecutive
non-sensitive, is not preserved since they do not have an overlap of k−1=3 letters.
3. We define the MCSR problem, which seeks to produce a string Z , by deleting or replacing all
separators in Y with letters from the alphabet of W so that: no sensitive patterns are reinstated
in Z ; occurrences of spurious patterns that may not be mined fromW but can be mined from Z ,
at a given support threshold τ , are prevented; and the distortion incurred by the replacements
in Z is bounded. The first requirement is to preserve privacy and the next two to preserve data
utility. We show that MCSR is NP-hard and propose a heuristic to attack it. We also show how to
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apply the heuristic, so that letter replacements do not result in implausible patterns that may reveal
the location of sensitive patterns. An implausible pattern is a string which is unlikely to occur in
Z as a substring. For example, such a pattern may correspond to an impossible or unlikely trip
in a sanitized movement dataset Z . When an occurrence of an implausible pattern is identified
in Z , it becomes easier to identify the letter that replaced a # in the implausible pattern, and thus
recover the sensitive pattern. To prevent this, we first define an implausible pattern as a statistically
unexpected string. Our definition is based on a statistical significance measure computed over a
reference dataset [7, 15, 42]. Specifically, an implausible pattern is a substring whose frequency
in W is significantly smaller than its expected frequency in W . Then, we modify MCSR-ALGO,
so that it does not replace any occurrence of # with letters that create implausible patterns. See
Section 6.
Example 1.3 (Cont’d from Example 1.2). Recall that Y = aaacbcbbba#aabaabbacaab. Let τ = 1.
A string Z = aaacbcbbbacaabaabbacaab is produced by replacing letter # with letter c. Note that
Z contains no sensitive pattern, nor a non-sensitive pattern of length-4 substring that could not
be mined fromW at a support threshold τ (i.e., a pattern that does not occur inW ). In addition, Z
contains no implausible pattern, such as bbab, which is not expected to occur inW , according to
an established statistical significance measure for strings [7, 15, 42].
4. We design an algorithm for solving the ETFS problem. The algorithm, called ETFS-ALGO, is
based on a connection between ETFS and the approximate regular expression matching prob-
lem [37]. Given a stringW and a regular expression E, the latter problem seeks to find a string T
that matches E and is at MED from W . ETFS-ALGO solves the ETFS problem in O (k |Σ|n2) time,
where |Σ| is the size of the alphabet ofW . See Section 7.
Example 1.4. Let W = aaaaaab, k = 4, and the set of sensitive patterns be {aaaa, aaab}. TFS-
ALGO constructs string X = ε , where ε is the empty string, with dE (W ,X ) = 7. On the contrary,
ETFS-ALGO constructs string XED = aaa#aab with dE (W ,XED) = 1 < 7. Clearly, string XED is
more suitable for applications, which are based on measuring sequence similarity.
5. For the MSL setting, we implemented our combinatorial approach for sanitizing a string W
(i.e., the aforementioned algorithms implementing the pipeline W → X → Y → Z ) and show its
effectiveness and efficiency on real and synthetic data. We also show that it possible to produce a
string Z that does not contain implausible patterns, while incurring insignificant additional utility
loss. See Section 8.
6. For the MED setting, we implemented ETFS-ALGO and experimentally compared it with TFS-
ALGO. Interestingly, we demonstrate that TFS-ALGO constructs optimal or near-optimal solutions
to the ETFS problem in practice. This is particularly encouraging because TFS-ALGO is linear in
the length of the input string n, whereas ETFS-ALGO is quadratic in n. See Section 8.
A preliminary version of this article, without the method that avoids implausible patterns and
without contributions 4 and 6, appeared in [10]. Furthermore, we include here all proofs omitted
from [10], as well as additional examples and discussion of related work.
2 RELATED WORK
We review related work in data sanitization (a.k.a. knowledge hiding) and data anonymization, two
of the main topics in the area of privacy-preserving data mining [6, 12]. Data sanitization aims at
concealing confidential knowledge, so that it is not easily discovered by mining a disseminated
dataset [1, 25, 49]. For example, data sanitization may be used by a business to prevent a recipient
of a dataset from inferring that a specific set of products (e.g., baking powder and flour) is purchased
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by many customers of the business [49]. This set of products needs to be concealed, as it provides
competitive advantage to the business.
On the other hand, data anonymization [4, 21, 36] aims at preventing a data recipient from
inferring information about individuals whose information is contained in the input dataset [22].
This includes inferences about the identity of an individual (identity disclosure), about whether
or not an individual’s information is contained in the output dataset (membership disclosure), as
well as inferences that generally depend on an individual’s information (inferential disclosure). For
example, data anonymization works are used to prevent a data recipient from inferring the identity
of an individual based on the products purchased by the individual, or from inferring that the
individual has purchased a sensitive product (e.g., a medicine revealing their health condition) [52].
2.1 Data Sanitization
Existing data sanitization approaches can be classified, based on the type of data they are applied
to, into those applied to a collection of records and others applied to a single sequence.
We first discuss data sanitization approaches that are applied to a collection of records. A record
can be a set of values (itemset) [39, 46, 49], a trajectory [1], or a sequence [1, 25, 27]. In set-
valued (transaction) datasets, the confidential knowledge to be hidden is typically modeled as a
set of itemsets [46], association rules [49], or classification rules [39]. In trajectory datasets, the
confidential knowledge is modeled as a set of subtrajectories [1]. Last, in sequential datasets, the
confidential knowledge is modeled as a set of sequential patterns occurring in the dataset [1, 25, 27].
In what follows, we review three data sanitization approaches [1, 25, 27], which are applied to a
collection of sequences, since they are the most relevant to our work. The key difference of these
approaches from our work is that they aim to hide sensitive patterns occurring as subsequences
(not only as substrings) in the input collection (not in a single, long string). Moreover, they aim to
hide sensitive patterns when these are sufficiently frequent; i.e., when a sensitive pattern occurs as
a subsequence of least τ records, where τ is a given minimum frequency threshold. The hiding of
a sensitive pattern is then performed by modifying some of the records in the collection (e.g., by
letter deletion [1]), so that fewer than τ records contain the sensitive pattern as a subsequence. In
our work, C1 implies that no occurrence of a sensitive pattern exists in the sanitized sequence.
The problem of sanitizing a collection of sequences was first proposed by Abul et al. [1]. The
authors developed a heuristic that applies deletion of letters contained in sensitive patterns. The
heuristic aims to minimize the number of deleted letters in the collection. However, it does not
focus on minimizing changes to the set of non-sensitive frequent sequential patterns that are in-
curred by deletions. In response, Gkoulalas-Divanis et al. [25] developed a heuristic that avoids
such changes, hence improving data utility for frequent sequential pattern mining and tasks based
on it. The heuristic of [25] first selects a sufficiently large subset of records to sanitize, favoring
records that can be sanitized with few deletions. Then, it sanitizes each selected record by con-
structing a graph that represents the matchings between the record and sensitive patterns, and
searching for graph nodes corresponding to good letters to delete. However, due to the fact that
graph search is computationally inefficient, the heuristic searches only a small part of the graph.
Gwadera et al. [27] proposed a heuristic, called Permutation Hiding (PH). PH addresses the limi-
tation of [1], as it aims to minimize changes to the set of non-sensitive frequent sequential patterns.
Also, it addresses the limitation of [25], as it avoids the expensive graph search. Furthermore, PH
employs both letter permutation and deletion to hide sensitive patterns. Permuting the letters of
a sensitive pattern hides the pattern but may change the set of non-sensitive frequent sequential
patterns. Thus, PH explores the space of possible permutations of the letters of a sensitive pattern
to find a permutation that minimizes the number of such changes. When this is not possible, PH
resorts to letter deletion.
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Table 1. The τ -lost and τ -ghost Patterns, for τ = 1, Created by Applying the PH
Heuristic [27] and Our Method on the String of Example 2.1
τ -lost τ -ghost
PH [27]
{abaa, aaac, aacb, bbba, baab, aabb,
abba, bbac, baca, acaa, caab}
{abac, bacb, bbbb,
bbbc, bbca, bcab}
Our method ∅ ∅
Thus, in summary, our approach differs from existing approaches that are applied to a collection
of sequences [1, 25, 27], in terms of: (I) input dataset (a collection of strings vs. a single string);
(II) occurrences of a sensitive pattern that must be hidden (occurrences as a subsequence vs. oc-
currences as a substring); (III) data modification strategy (deletion and/or permutation vs. copying
of non-sensitive substrings and letter replacement); and (IV) utility considerations (no guarantees
on minimizing changes to non-confidential frequent sequential patterns vs. guarantees on utility
properties). Although these data sanitization methods were designed for the general case of a col-
lection of sequences, they could in principle be applied to a single string. Through the following
example, we illustrate this point and also highlight the difference with respect to the goals of our
methods.
Example 2.1. Let W = aabaaacbcbbbaabbacaab, k = 4, and the set of sensitive patterns be
{baaa, bbaa}. Consider applying the PH heuristic [27] using a minimum frequency threshold τ = 1.
PH constructs a string I = aaba**cbcbbb**bb*ca*b, deleting six letters ofW that are represented
by the special letter * for the sake of clarity. PH also creates non-sensitive length-k substrings
that can be mined fromW but cannot be mined from Z at frequency threshold τ , as well as non-
sensitive length-k substrings that cannot be mined fromW but can be mined from Z at frequency
threshold τ . These substrings are referred to as τ -lost and τ -ghost patterns, respectively. Specifi-
cally, as shown in Table 1, PH created 11 τ -lost and 6 τ -ghost patterns. On the other hand, applying
our approach (i.e., the pipeline TFS-ALGO→ PFS-ALGO→ MCSR-ALGO) with τ = 1 produces a
string Z = aaacbcbbbacaabaabbacaab with neither τ -lost nor τ -ghost patterns, as mentioned in
Example 1.3. The reader can perhaps share the intuition that string Z is more useful than string I ,
as Z preserves the set of non-sensitive frequent sequential patterns that can be mined at τ = 1.
The main reason PH incurs substantially more τ -lost and τ -ghost patterns than our method is
because it hides the sensitive patterns when they occur as subsequences of the input string. That is,
it hides all occurrences of each sensitive pattern in the string, albeit only occurrences comprised of
consecutive letters (i.e., substrings) need to be hidden in our setting. For instance, two occurrences
of the letter a have been deleted from the suffix bbacaab of W to prevent the sensitive pattern
bbaa from occurring as a subsequence (the subsequence is comprised of the underlined letters in
W ). Note, however, that pattern bbaa does not occur as a substring in this suffix ofW .
In what follows, we review three data sanitization approaches [14, 31, 50], which are applied to
a single sequence.
The work of Loukides et al. [31] is applied to a single event-sequence, in which each event
is a multi-set of letters associated with a timestamp. Their work aims to hide sensitive patterns
comprised of a single letter. Each such pattern is considered hidden when its relative frequency
in any prefix of the event-sequence is sufficiently low. The hiding is performed by a dynamic-
programming algorithm that applies letter deletion, while preserving the distribution of events
across the sequence. The approach of [31] cannot be readily extended to hide sensitive patterns of
length k > 1, which is our privacy objective. Moreover, it has a different utility criterion than our
work, and it does not guarantee the satisfaction of the utility properties we consider here.
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The work of Bonomi et al. [13] is applied to a single sequence and aims to prevent an attacker,
who has background knowledge about the frequency distribution of sensitive patterns in the input
sequence, from gaining additional knowledge about the frequency distribution of sensitive pat-
terns by observing the sanitized sequence. This is performed by limiting the mutual information
between the frequency distribution of sensitive patterns in the original and sanitized sequence. In
other words, sensitive patterns are protected when their frequencies are similar in the input and in
the sanitized sequence. On the other hand, in our work, we consider a setting where sensitive pat-
terns are unknown to the attacker and aim to prevent the attacker from observing their presence
in the sanitized sequence. The hiding of sensitive patterns in [13] is performed by heuristics which
aim to apply a small amount of generalization [43]. Generalization replaces a letter with an ag-
gregate letter that is not part of the sequence alphabet, thereby introducing uncertainty. Thus, the
work of [13] aims to produce sanitized data with a low level of uncertainty and does not focus on
guaranteeing the accuracy of mining frequent substrings comprised of the letters of the alphabet.
The work of Wang et al. [50] is applied to an event-sequence, in which each event is a single letter
associated with a timestamp. Their work considers the problem of deleting events in a given se-
quence, so as to reduce the ability of an attacker to detect sensitive patterns, while maximizing the
detection of non-sensitive patterns. A pattern is detected when it occurs as a subsequence within a
specified time window of the sequence. To solve this problem, the approach of [50] deletes events
from the sequence in order to maximize a weighted utility function expressed as a sum of terms.
An occurrence of a non-sensitive (respectively, sensitive) pattern in the sequence contributes a
positive (respectively, negative) term to this function. Thus, [50] considers protecting sensitive
patterns that occur as subsequences rather than as substrings, and it aims to achieve a good bal-
ance between matching non-sensitive patterns and preventing the matching of sensitive patterns.
2.2 Data Anonymization
Data anonymization is a different direction in privacy-preserving data mining than data sanitiza-
tion [2, 5]. Data anonymization has been the focus of many research works (see [5, 23] for surveys).
This includes works for anonymizing string data [3, 4, 14, 17]. The works of Aggarwal and Yu [3,
4] aim to enforce k-anonymity [43] on a collection of strings. This is performed by first grouping
strings, so that each group contains at least k similar strings, and then replacing the strings in each
group with a carefully constructed synthetic string. The work of [14] aims to release differentially
private [21] top-k frequent substrings from a collection of strings, where k denotes the number of
frequent substrings required. This is performed by building a noisy summary data structure that
represents the collection and then mining the top-k frequent substrings from the data structure.
The work of [17] aims to release a differentially private collection of strings. This is performed
by exploiting the variable-length n-gram model [35] and calibrating the noise needed to enforce
differential privacy based on the model.
The aforementioned anonymization methods aim to prevent privacy threats other than elim-
inating sensitive substrings from a string to prevent their mining. The threats they are dealing
with, following the terminology of [22], are: identity disclosure for [3, 4] and membership as well
as inferential disclosure for [14, 17]. Thus, our work is related to anonymization approaches in
that it shares the general objective of protecting string data with [3, 4] and that of protecting data
while supporting string mining with the work of [14].
3 PRELIMINARIES, PROBLEM STATEMENTS, AND MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we start with providing some preliminary definitions. Then, we define our problems
and introduce our main results. A summary of the acronyms introduced in the article is in Table 2.
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Table 2. Acronyms Used Throughout
Acronym Meaning
CSD Combinatorial String Dissemination model
MSL Minimal String Length setting
MED Minimal Edit Distance setting
TFS Total order, Frequency, Sanitization problem
PFS Partial order, Frequency, Sanitization problem
MCSR Minimum-Cost Separators Replacement problem
ETFS Edit-distance, Total order, Frequency, Sanitization problem
PH Permutation Hiding heuristic [27]
MCK Multiple Choice Knapsack problem [29]
FO-SSM Fixed-Overlap Shortest String with Multiplicities problem
SCS Shortest Common Superstring problem [24]
OLD Oldenburg dataset [1]
TRU Trucks dataset [25]
MSN MSNBC dataset [27]
DNA The complete genome of Escherichia coli dataset [31]
SYN Synthetic dataset
Preliminaries. Let T = T [0]T [1] . . .T [n − 1] be a string of length |T | = n over a finite ordered
alphabet Σ of size |Σ| = σ . By Σ∗ we denote the set of all strings over Σ. By Σk we denote the set of
all length-k strings over Σ. For two positions i and j onT , we denote byT [i . . j] = T [i] . . .T [j] the
substring of T that starts at position i and ends at position j of T . By ε we denote the empty string
of length 0. A prefix of T is a substring of the form T [0 . . j], and a suffix of T is a substring of the
form T [i . .n − 1]. A proper prefix (suffix) of a string is not equal to the string itself. By FreqV (U )
we denote the number of occurrences of string U in string V . Given two strings U and V we say
that U has a suffix-prefix overlap of length  > 0 with V if and only if the length- suffix of U is
equal to the length- prefix of V , i.e., U [|U | −  . . |U | − 1] = V [0 . .  − 1].
We fix a stringW of length n over an alphabet Σ = {1, . . . ,nO (1) } and an integer 0 < k < n. We
refer to a length-k string or a pattern interchangeably. An occurrence of a pattern is uniquely rep-
resented by its starting position. Let S be a set of positions over {0, . . . ,n − k } with the following
closure property: for every i ∈ S, if there exists j such that W [j . . j + k − 1] =W [i . . i + k − 1],
then j ∈ S. That is, if an occurrence of a pattern is in S all its occurrences are in S. A substring
W [i . . i + k − 1] ofW is called sensitive if and only if i ∈ S. S is thus the set of occurrences of sen-
sitive patterns. The difference set I = {0, . . . ,n − k } \ S is the set of occurrences of non-sensitive
patterns.
For any stringU , we denote byIU the set of occurrences of non-sensitive length-k strings over Σ
inU . (We have thatIW = I.) We call an occurrence i the t-predecessor of another occurrence j inIU
if and only if i is the largest element in IU that is less than j. This relation induces a strict total order
on the occurrences in IU . We call i the p-predecessor of j in IU if and only if i is the t-predecessor
of j in IU and U [i . . i + k − 1] has a suffix–prefix overlap of length k − 1 with U [j . . j + k − 1].
This relation induces a strict partial order on the occurrences in IU . We call a subset J of IU a
t-chain (resp., p-chain) if for all elements in J except the minimum one, their t-predecessor (resp.,
p-predecessor) is also in J . For two stringsU andV , chains JU and JV are equivalent, denoted by
JU ≡ JV , if and only if |JU | = |JV | and U [u . .u + k − 1] = V [v . .v + k − 1], where u is the jth
smallest element of JU and v is the jth smallest of JV , for all j ≤ |JU |.
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Given two strings U and V the edit distance dE (U ,V ) is defined as the minimum number of
elementary edit operations (letter insertion, deletion, or substitution) to transform U to V .
The set of regular expressions over an alphabet Σ is defined recursively as follows [37]: (I) a ∈ Σ ∪
{ε }, where ε denotes the empty string, is a regular expression. (II) If E and F are regular expressions,
then so are EF , E |F , and E∗, where EF denotes the set of strings obtained by concatenating a string
in E and a string in F , E |F is the union of the strings in E and F , and E∗ consists of all strings
obtained by concatenating zero or more strings from E. Parentheses are used to override the natural
precedence of the operators, which places the operator ∗ highest, the concatenation next, and the
operator | last. We state that a string T matches a regular expression E, if T is equal to one of the
strings in E.
Problem Statements and Main Results. We define the following problem for the MSL setting.
Problem 1 (TFS). GivenW , k , S, and IW construct the shortest string X :
C1 X does not contain any sensitive pattern.
P1 IW ≡ IX , i.e., the t-chains IW and IX are equivalent.
P2 FreqX (U ) = FreqW (U ), for all U ∈ Σk \ {W [i . . i + k − 1] : i ∈ S}.
TFS requires constructing the shortest string X in which all sensitive patterns fromW are con-
cealed (C1), while preserving the order (P1) and the frequency (P2) of all non-sensitive patterns.
Our first result is the following.
Theorem 3.1. Let W be a string of length n over Σ = {1, . . . ,nO (1) }. Given k < n and S, TFS-
ALGO solves Problem 1 in O (kn) time, which is worst-case optimal. An O (n)-sized representation of
X can be built in O (n) time.
P1 implies P2, but P1 is a strong assumption that may result in long output strings that are
inefficient to analyze. We thus relax P1 to require that the order of appearance remains the same
only for sequences of consecutive non-sensitive length-k substrings that also overlap by k − 1
letters (p-chains). This leads to the following problem for the MSL setting.
Problem 2 (PFS). GivenW , k , S, and IW construct a shortest string Y :
C1 Y does not contain any sensitive pattern.
Π1 There exists an injective function f from the p-chains of IW to the p-chains of IY such that
f (JW ) ≡ JW for any p-chain JW of IW .
P2 FreqY (U ) = FreqW (U ), for all U ∈ Σk \ {W [i . . i + k − 1] : i ∈ S}.
Our second result, which builds on Theorem 3.1, is the following.
Theorem 3.2. LetW be a string of lengthn over Σ = {1, . . . ,nO (1) }. Givenk < n andS, PFS-ALGO
solves Problem 2 in the optimal O (n + |Y |) time.
To arrive at Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, we use a special letter (separator) #  Σ when required. How-
ever, the occurrences of # may reveal the locations of sensitive patterns. We thus seek to delete
or replace the occurrences of # in Y with letters from Σ. The new string Z should not reinstate
sensitive patterns or create implausible patterns. Given an integer threshold τ > 0, we call a pat-
ternU ∈ Σk a τ − ghost in Z if and only if FreqW (U ) < τ but FreqZ (U ) ≥ τ . Moreover, we seek to
prevent τ -ghost occurrences in Z by also bounding the total weight of the letter choices we make
to replace the occurrences of #. This is the MCSR problem. We show that already a restricted ver-
sion of the MCSR problem, namely, the version when k = 1, is NP-hard via the Multiple Choice
Knapsack (MCK) problem [40].
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Fig. 1. Sensitive patterns are underlined in red; non-sensitive patterns are overlined in blue; X̃ is obtained by
applying R1; and X by applying R1 and R2. In green we highlight an overlap of k − 1 = 3 letters.
Theorem 3.3. The MCSR problem is NP-hard.
Based on this connection, we propose a non-trivial heuristic algorithm to attack the MCSR prob-
lem for the general case of an arbitrary k .
We define the following problem for the MED setting.
Problem 3 (ETFS). Given W , k , S, and I, construct a string XED which is at MED from W and
satisfies the following:
C1 XED does not contain any sensitive pattern.
P1 IW ≡ IXED , i.e., the t-chains IW and IXED are equivalent.
P2 FreqXED (U ) = FreqW (U ), for all U ∈ Σk \ {W [i . . i + k − 1] : i ∈ S}.
We show how to reduce any instance of the ETFS problem to some instance of the approximate
regular expression matching problem. In particular, the latter instance consists of a string of length
n (stringW ) and a regular expression E of length O (k |Σ|n). We thus prove the claim of Theorem 3.4
by employing the O ( |W | · |E |)-time algorithm of [37].
Theorem 3.4. LetW be a string of length n over an alphabet Σ. Given k < n and S, ETFS-ALGO
solves Problem 3 in O (k |Σ|n2) time.
4 TFS-ALGO
We convert stringW into a stringX over alphabet Σ ∪ {#}, #  Σ, by reading the letters ofW , from
left to right, and appending them to X while enforcing the following two rules:
R1: When the last letter of a sensitive substring U is read fromW , we append # to X (essentially
replacing this last letter ofU with #). Then, we append the succeeding non-sensitive substring (in
the t-predecessor order) after #.
R2: When the k − 1 letters before # are the same as the k − 1 letters after #, we remove # and the
k − 1 succeeding letters (inspect Figure 1).
R1 preventsU from occurring inX , and R2 reduces the length ofX (i.e., allows to hide sensitive
patterns with fewer extra letters). Both rules leave unchanged the order and frequencies of non-
sensitive patterns. It is crucial to observe that applying the idea behind R2 on more than k − 1
letters would decrease the frequency of some pattern, while applying it on fewer than k − 1 letters
would create new patterns. Thus, we need to consider just R2 as-is.
Let C be an array of size n that stores the occurrences of sensitive and non-sensitive patterns:
C[i] = 1 if i ∈ S andC[i] = 0 if i ∈ I. For technical reasons we set the last k − 1 values inC equal
to C[n − k]; i.e., C[n − k + 1] := . . . := C[n − 1] := C[n − k]. Note that C is constructible from S
in O (n) time. GivenC and k < n, TFS-ALGO efficiently constructs X by implementing R1 and R2
concurrently as opposed to implementing R1 and then R2 (see the proof of Lemma 4.1 for details
of the workings of TFS-ALGO and Figure 1 for an example). We next show that string X enjoys
several properties.
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Lemma 4.1. LetW be a string of length n over Σ. Given k < n and array C , TFS-ALGO constructs
the shortest string X such that the following hold:
(I) There exists noW [i . . i + k − 1] with C[i] = 1 occurring in X (C1).
(II) IW ≡ IX , i.e., the order of substringsW [i . . i + k − 1], for all i such that C[i] = 0, is the same
inW and in X ; conversely, the order of all substrings U ∈ Σk of X is the same in X and inW
(P1).
(III) FreqX (U ) = FreqW (U ), for all U ∈ Σk \ {W [i . . i + k − 1] : C[i] = 1} (P2).
(IV) The occurrences of letter # in X are at most 
 n−k+12  and they are at least k positions apart
(P3).
(V) 0 ≤ |X | ≤ n−k+12  · k + 

n−k+1
2  and these bounds are tight (P4).
TFS-ALGO(W ∈ Σn ,C,k, #  Σ)
1 X ← ε ; j ← |W |;  ← 0;
2 j ← min{i |C[i] = 0}; /* j is the leftmost pos of a non-sens. pattern */
3 if j + k − 1 < |W | then /* Append the first non-sens. pattern to X */
4 X [0 . .k − 1]←W [j . . j + k − 1]; j ← j + k ;  ←  + k ;
5 while j < |W | do /* Examine two consecutive patterns */
6 p ← j − k ; c ← p + 1;
7 if C[p] = C[c] = 0 then /* If both are non-sens., append the last letter of the
rightmost one to X */
8 X []←W [j];  ←  + 1; j ← j + 1;
9 if C[p] = 0 ∧C[c] = 1 then /* If the rightmost is sens., mark it and advance j */
10 f ← c;j ← j + 1;
11 if C[p] = C[c] = 1 then j ← j + 1; /* If both are sens., advance j */
12 if C[p] = 1 ∧C[c] = 0 then /* If the leftmost is sens. and the rightmost is not */
13 if W [c . . c + k − 2] =W [f . . f + k − 2] then /* If the last marked sens. pattern and
the current non-sens. overlap by k − 1, append the last letter of the latter
to X */
14 X []←W [j];  ←  + 1; j ← j + 1;
15 else /* Else append # and the current non-sens. pattern to X */
16 X []← #;  ←  + 1;
17 X [ . .  + k − 1]←W [j − k + 1 . . j];  ←  + k ; j ← j + 1;
18 report X
Proof. C1: Index j in TFS-ALGO runs over the positions of stringW ; at any moment it indicates
the ending position of the currently considered length-k substring of W . When C[j − k + 1] = 1
(Lines 9–11) TFS-ALGO never appendsW [j], i.e., the last letter of a sensitive length-k substring,
implying that, by construction of C , noW [i . . i + k − 1] with C[i] = 1 occurs in X .
P1: When C[j − k] = C[j − k + 1] = 0 (Lines 7 and 8) TFS-ALGO appends W [j] to X , thus
the order of W [j − k . . j − 1] and W [j − k + 1 . . j] is clearly preserved. When C[j − k] = 0 and
C[j − k + 1] = 1, index f stores the starting position on W of the (k − 1)-length suffix of the last
non-sensitive substring appended to X (see also Figure 1). C1 ensures that no sensitive substring
is added to X in this case, nor when C[j − k] = C[j − k + 1] = 1. The next letter will thus be
appended to X when C[j − k] = 1 and C[j − k + 1] = 0 (Lines 12–17). The condition on Line 13 is
satisfied if and only if the last non-sensitive length-k substring appended to X overlaps with the
immediately succeeding non-sensitive one by k − 1 letters: in this case, the last letter of the latter
is appended to X by Line 14, clearly maintaining the order of the two. Otherwise, Line 17 will
appendW [j − k + 1 . . j] to X , once again maintaining the length-k substrings’ order. Conversely,
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by construction, any U ∈ Σk occurs in X only if it equals a length-k non-sensitive substring of
W . The only occasion when a letter from W is appended to X more then once is when Line 17
is executed: it is easy to see that in this case, because of the occurrence of #, each of the k − 1 re-
peated letters creates exactly oneU  Σk , without introducing any new length-k string over Σ nor
increasing the occurrences of a previous one. Finally, Line 14 does not introduce any newU ∈ Σk
except for the one present inW , nor any extra occurrence of the latter, because it is only executed
when two consecutive non-sensitive length-k substrings ofW overlap exactly by k − 1 letters.
P2: It follows from the proof for C1 and P1.
P3: Letter # is added only by Line 16, which is executed only when C[j − k] = 1 and C[j − k +
1] = 0. This can be the case up to n−k+12  times as array C can have alternate values only in the
first n − k + 1 positions. By construction, X cannot start with # (Lines 2–4), and thus the maximal
number of occurrences of # is 
 n−k+12 . By construction, letter # inX is followed by at least k letters
(Line 17): the leftmost non-sensitive substring following a sequence of one or more occurrences
of sensitive substrings inW .
P4: Upper bound. TFS-ALGO increases the length of stringX by more than one letter only when
letter # is added to X (Line 16). Every time Lines 16–17 are executed, the length of X increases by
k + 1 letters. Thus the length of X is maximized when the maximal number of occurrences of # is




Tightness. For the lower bound, let W = an and ak be sensitive. The condition at Line 3 is not
satisfied because no element inC is set to 0: j = n. Then the condition on Line 5 is also not satisfied
because j = n, and thus TFS-ALGO outputs the empty string. A de Bruijn sequence of order k over
an alphabet Σ is a string in which every possible length-k string over Σ occurs exactly once as a
substring. For the upper bound, let W be the order-(k − 1) de Bruijn sequence over alphabet Σ,
n − k be even, and S = {1, 3, 5, . . . ,n − k − 1}. C[0] = 0 and so Line 4 will add the first k letters of
W to X . Then observe that C[1] = 1,C[2] = 0;C[3] = 1,C[4] = 0, . . ., and so on; this sequence of
values corresponds to satisfying Lines 12 and 9 alternately. Line 9 does not add any letter toX . The
if statement on Line 13 will always fail because of the de Bruijn sequence property. We thus have a
sequence of the non-sensitive length-k substrings ofW interleaved by occurrences of # appended
to X . TFS-ALGO thus outputs a string of length n−k+12  · k + 

n−k+1
2  (see Example 4.2).
We finally prove that X has minimal length. Let X j be the prefix of string X obtained by pro-
cessing W [0 . . j]. Let jmin = min{i |C[i] = 0} + k − 1. We will proceed by induction on j, claiming
that X j is the shortest string such that C1 and P1–P4 hold forW [0 . . j], ∀ jmin ≤ j ≤ |W | − 1. We
call such a string optimal.
Base case: j = jmin. By Lines 3 and 4 of TFS-ALGO, X j is equal to the first non-sensitive length-k
substring ofW , and it is clearly the shortest string such that C1 and P1–P4 hold forW [0 . . j].
Inductive hypothesis and step: X j−1 is optimal for j > jmin. If C[j − k] = C[j − k + 1] = 0, X j =
X j−1W [j] and this is clearly optimal. IfC[j − k + 1] = 1,X j = X j−1 thus still optimal. Finally, ifC[j −
k] = 1 andC[j − k + 1] = 0 we have two subcases: ifW [f . . f + k − 2] =W [j − k + 1 . . j − 1] then
X j = X j−1W [j], and once again X j is evidently optimal. Otherwise, X j = X j−1#W [j − k + 1 . . j].
Suppose by contradiction that there exists a shorter X ′j such that C1 and P1–P4 still hold: either
drop # or append less than k letters after #. If we appended less than k letters after #, since TFS-
ALGO will not readW [j] ever again, P2–P3 would be violated, as an occurrence ofW [j − k + 1 . . j]
would be missed. Without #, the last k letters of X j−1W [j − k + 1] would violate either C1 or P1
and P2 (since we supposeW [f . . f + k − 2] W [j − k + 1 . . j − 1]). Then X j is optimal. 
Example 4.2 (Illustration of P3). Let k = 4. We construct the order-3 de Bruijn sequence
W = baaabbbaba of length n = 10 over alphabet Σ = {a, b}, and choose S = {1, 3, 5}. TFS-ALGO
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constructs:
X = baaa#aabb#bbba#baba.
The upper bound of n−k+12  · k + 

n−k+1
2  = 19 on the length of X is attained.
Let us now show the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.1. Let W be a string of length n over Σ = {1, . . . ,nO (1) }. Given k < n and S, TFS-
ALGO solves Problem 1 in O (kn) time, which is worst-case optimal. An O (n)-sized representation of
X can be built in O (n) time.
Proof. For the first part inspect TFS-ALGO. Lines 2–4 can be realized in O (n) time. The while
loop in Line 5 is executed no more thann times, and every operation inside the loop takesO (1) time
except for Line 13 and Line 17 which take O (k ) time. Correctness and optimality follow directly
from Lemma 4.1 (P4).
For the second part, we assume thatX is represented byW and a sequence of pointers [i, j] toW
interleaved (if necessary) by occurrences of #. In Line 17, we can use an interval [i, j] to represent
the length-k substring ofW added toX . In all other lines (Lines 4, 8, and 14) we can use [i, i] as one
letter is added toX per one letter ofW . By Lemma 4.1 we can have at most 
 n−k+12  occurrences of
letter #. The check at Line 13 can be implemented in constant time after linear-time pre-processing
ofW for longest common extension queries [19]. All other operations take in total linear time in
n. Thus there exists an O (n)-sized representation of X and it is constructible in O (n) time. 
5 PFS-ALGO
Lemma 4.1 tells us that X is the shortest string satisfying constraint C1 and properties P1–P4. If
we were to drop P1 and employ the partial order Π1 (see Problem 2), the length ofX = X1# . . . #XN
would not always be minimal: if a permutation of the stringsX1, . . . ,XN contains pairsXi ,X j with
a suffix-prefix overlap of length  = k − 1, we may further apply R2, obtaining a shorter string.
To find such a permutation efficiently and construct a shorter string Y from W , we propose
PFS-ALGO. The crux of our algorithm is an efficient method to solve a variant of the classic NP-
complete Shortest Common Superstring (SCS) problem [24]. Specifically our algorithm: (I) Com-
putes the string X using Theorem 3.1. (II) Constructs a collection B′ of strings, each of two letters
(two ranks); the first (resp., second) letter is the lexicographic rank of the length- prefix (resp.,
suffix) of each string in the collection B = {X1, . . . ,XN }. (III) Computes a shortest string contain-
ing every element in B′ as a distinct substring. (IV) ConstructsY by mapping back each element to
its distinct substring in B. If there are multiple possible shortest strings, one is selected arbitrarily.
Example 5.1 (Illustration of the Workings of PFS-ALGO). Let  = k − 1 = 3 and
X = aabaa#aaacbcbbba#baabbacaab.
The collection B is comprised of the following substrings: X1 = aabaa, X2 = aaacbcbbba, and
X3 = baabbacaab. The collection B′ is comprised of the following two-letter strings: 23, 14, 32. To
construct B′, we first find the length-3 prefix and the length-3 suffix of each Xi , i ∈ [1, 3], which
leads to a collection {aab, baa, aaa, bba}. Then, we sort the collection lexicographically to obtain
{aaa, aab, baa, bba}, and last we replace each Xi , i ∈ [1, 3], with the lexicographic ranks of its
length-3 prefix and length-3 suffix. For instance, X1 is replaced by 23. After that, a shortest string
containing all elements of B′ as distinct substrings is computed as: 14 · 232. This shortest string
is mapped back to the solution Y = aaacbcbbba#aabaabbacaab. Note, Y contains one occurrence
of # and has length 23, while X contains 2 occurrences of # and has length 27.
We now present the details of PFS-ALGO. We first introduce the Fixed-Overlap Shortest String
with Multiplicities (FO-SSM) problem: Given a collection B of strings B1, . . . ,B |B | and an integer ,
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with |Bi | > , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |B|, FO-SSM seeks to find a shortest string containing each element
of B as a distinct substring using the following operations on any pair of strings Bi ,Bj :
(I) concat(Bi ,Bj ) = Bi · Bj ;
(II) -merge(Bi ,Bj ) = Bi [0 . . |Bi | − 1 − ]Bj [0 . . |Bj | − 1] = Bi [0 . . |Bi | − 1 − ] · Bj .
Any solution to FO-SSM with  := k − 1 andB := X1, . . . ,XN implies a solution to the PFS prob-
lem, because |Xi | > k − 1 for all i’s (see Lemma 4.1, P3)
The FO-SSM problem is a variant of the SCS problem. In the SCS problem, we are given a set of
strings and we are asked to compute the shortest common superstring of the elements of this set.
The SCS problem is known to be NP-complete, even for binary strings [24]. However, if all strings
are of length two, the SCS problem admits a linear-time solution [24]. We exploit this crucial detail
positively to show a linear-time solution to the FO-SSM problem in Lemma 5.3. In order to arrive
to this result, we first adapt the SCS linear-time solution of [24] to our needs (see Lemma 5.2) and
plug this solution into Lemma 5.3.
Lemma 5.2. Let Q be a collection of q strings, each of length two, over an alphabet Σ =
{1, . . . , (2q)O (1) }. We can compute a shortest string containing every element of Q as a distinct sub-
string in O (q) time.
Proof. We sort the elements of Q lexicographically in O (q) time using radixsort. We also re-
place every letter in these strings with their lexicographic rank from {1, . . . , 2q} in O (q) time using
radixsort. In O (q) time we construct the de Bruijn multigraph G of these strings [16]. Within the
same time complexity, we find all nodes v in G with in-degree, denoted by IN(v ), smaller than
out-degree, denoted by OUT(v ). We perform the following two steps:
Step 1. While there exists a node v in G with IN(v ) < OUT(v ), we start an arbitrary path (with
possibly repeated nodes) from v , traverse consecutive edges and delete them. Each time we delete
an edge, we update the in- and out-degree of the affected nodes. We stop traversing edges when
a node v ′ with OUT(v ′) = 0 is reached: whenever IN(v ′) = OUT(v ′) = 0, we also delete v ′ from
G. Then, we add the traversed path p = v . . .v ′ to a set P of paths. The path can contain the same
node v more than once. If G is empty we halt. Proceeding this way, there are no two elements p1
and p2 in P such that p1 starts withv and p2 ends withv ; thus this path decomposition is minimal.
If G is not empty at the end, by construction, it consists of only cycles.
Step 2. While G is not empty, we perform the following. If there exists a cycle c that intersects
with any path p in P we splice c into p, update p with the result of splicing, and delete c from G.
This operation can be efficiently implemented by maintaining an array A of size 2q of linked lists
over the paths in P: A[α] stores a list of pointers to all occurrences of letter α in the elements of
P. Thus in constant time per node of c we check if any such path p exists in P and splice the two
in this case. If no such path exists in P, we add to P any of the path-linearizations of the cycle,
and delete the cycle from G. After each change to P, we update A and delete every node u with
IN(u) = OUT(u) = 0 from G.
The correctness of this algorithm follows from the fact that P is a minimal path decomposition
ofG. Thus any concatenation of paths in P represents a shortest string containing all elements in
Q as distinct substrings. 
Lemma 5.3. Let B be a collection of strings over an alphabet Σ = {1, . . . , | |B||O (1) }. Given an inte-
ger , the FO-SSM problem for B can be solved in O ( | |B||) time.
Proof. Consider the following renaming technique. Each length- substring of the collection
is assigned a lexicographic rank from the range {1, . . . , | |B||}. Each string in B is converted to a
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two-letter string as follows. The first letter is the lexicographic rank of its length- prefix and the
second letter is the lexicographic rank of its length- suffix. We thus obtain a new collection B′
of two-letter strings. Computing the ranks for all length- substrings in B can be implemented
in O ( | |B||) time by employing radixsort to sort Σ and then the well-known Longest Common
Prefix (LCP) data structure over the concatenation of strings in B [19]. The FO-SSM problem is
thus solved by finding a shortest string containing every element of B′ as a distinct substring.
Since B′ consists of two-letter strings only we can solve the problem in O ( |B′|) time by applying
Lemma 5.2. The statement follows. 
Thus, PFS-ALGO applies Lemma 5.3 on B := X1, . . . ,XN with  := k − 1 (recall that
X1# . . . #XN = X ). Note that each time the concat operation is performed, it also places the letter
# in between the two strings.
Lemma 5.4. LetW be a string of length n over an alphabet Σ. Given k < n and arrayC , PFS-ALGO
constructs a shortest string Y with C1, Π1, and P2-P4.
Proof. C1 and P2 hold trivially for Y as no length-k substring over Σ is added or removed
from X . Let X = X1# . . . #XN . The order of non-sensitive length-k substrings within Xi , for all
i ∈ [1,N ], is preserved in Y . Thus there exists an injective function f from the p-chains of IW
to the p-chains of IY such that f (JW ) ≡ JW for any p-chain JW of IW (Π1 is preserved). P3
also holds trivially for Y as no occurrence of # is added. Since |Y | ≤ |X |, for P4, it suffices to note
that the construction ofW in the proof of tightness in Lemma 4.1 (see also Example 4.2) ensures
that there is no suffix-prefix overlap of length k − 1 between any pair of length-k substrings of
Y over Σ due to the property of the order-(k − 1) de Bruijn sequence. Thus the upper bound of
n−k+12  · k + 

n−k+1
2  on the length of X is also tight for Y .
The minimality on the length of Y follows from the minimality of |X | and the correctness of
Lemma 5.3 that computes a shortest such string. 
Let us now show the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.2. LetW be a string of lengthn over Σ = {1, . . . ,nO (1) }. Givenk < n andS, PFS-ALGO
solves Problem 2 in the optimal O (n + |Y |) time.
Proof. We compute the O (n)-sized representation of string X with respect toW described in
the proof of Theorem 3.1. This can be done in O (n) time. If X ∈ Σ∗, then we construct and return
Y := X in time O ( |Y |) from the representation. If X ∈ (Σ ∪ {#})∗, implying |Y | ≤ |X |, we compute
the LCP data structure of string W in O (n) time [19]; and implement Lemma 5.3 in O (n) time
by avoiding to read string X explicitly: we rather rename X1, . . . ,XN to a collection of two-letter
strings by employing the LCP information ofW directly. We then construct and report Y in time
O ( |Y |). Correctness follows directly from Lemma 5.4. 
6 MCSR PROBLEM, MCSR-ALGO, AND IMPLAUSIBLE PATTERN ELIMINATION
In the following, we introduce the MCSR problem and prove that it is NP-hard (see Section 6.1).
Then, we introduce MCSR-ALGO, a heuristic to address this problem (see Section 6.2). Finally, we
discuss how to configure MCSR-ALGO in order to eliminate implausible patterns (see Section 6.3).
6.1 The MCSR Problem
The strings X and Y , constructed by TFS-ALGO and PFS-ALGO, respectively, may contain the
separator #, which reveals information about the location of the sensitive patterns in W . Specif-
ically, a malicious data recipient can go to the position of a # in X and “undo” Rule R1 that has
been applied by TFS-ALGO, removing # and the k − 1 letters after # from X . The result could be
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an occurrence of the sensitive pattern. For example, applying this process to the first # inX shown
in Figure 1, results in recovering the sensitive pattern abab. A similar attack is possible on the
string Y produced by PFS-ALGO, although it is hampered by the fact that substrings within two
consecutive #s in X often swap places in Y .
To address this issue, we seek to construct a new string Z , in which #s are either deleted or
replaced by letters from Σ. To preserve data utility, we favor separator replacements that have a
small cost in terms of occurrences of τ -ghosts (patterns with frequency less than τ inW and at least
τ in Z ) and incur a level of distortion bounded by a parameter θ in Z . The cost of an occurrence of
a τ -ghost at a certain position is given by function Ghost, while function Sub assigns a distortion
weight to each letter that could replace a #. Both functions will be described in further detail below.
To preserve privacy, we require separator replacements not to reinstate sensitive patterns. This
is the MCSR problem, a restricted version of which is presented in Problem 4. The restricted version
is referred to as MCSRk=1 and differs from MCSR in that it uses k = 1 for the pattern length instead
of an arbitrary value k > 0. MCSRk=1 is presented next for simplicity and because it is used in the
proof of Lemma 6.1. Lemma 6.1 implies Theorem 3.3.
Problem 4 (MCSRk=1). Given a string Y over an alphabet Σ ∪ {#} with δ > 0 occurrences of letter
#, and parameters τ and θ , construct a new string Z by substituting the δ occurrences of # in Y with
letters from Σ, such that:
(I)
∑
i :Y [i]=#, FreqY (Z [i])<τ
FreqZ (Z [i])≥τ
Ghost(i,Z [i]) is minimum, and (II)
∑
i :Y [i]=#
Sub(i,Z [i]) ≤ θ .
Lemma 6.1. The MCSRk=1 problem is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce the NP-hard Multiple Choice Knapsack (MCK) problem [45] to MCSRk=1 in
polynomial time. In MCK, we are given a set of elements subdivided into δ , mutually exclusive
classes, C1, . . . ,Cδ , and a knapsack. Each class Ci has |Ci | elements. Each element j ∈ Ci has an
arbitrary cost ci j ≥ 0 and an arbitrary weight wi j . The goal is to minimize the total cost (Equa-
tion (1)) by filling the knapsack with one element from each class (constraint II), such that the
weights of the elements in the knapsack satisfy constraint I, where constant b ≥ 0 represents the






ci j · xi j (1)




j ∈Ci wi j · xi j ≥ b, (II)
∑
j ∈Ci xi j = 1, i = 1, . . . δ , and (III)
xi j ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . ,δ , j ∈ Ci .
The variable xi j takes value 1 if the element j is chosen from class Ci , 0 otherwise (constraint
III). We reduce any instance IMCK to an instance IMCSRk=1 in polynomial time, as follows:
(I) Alphabet Σ consists of letters αi j , for each j ∈ Ci and each class Ci , i ∈ [1,δ].
(II) We setY = α11α12 . . . α1 |C1 |# . . . #αδ 1αδ 2 . . . αδ |Cδ |#. Every element of Σ occurs exactly once:
FreqY (αi j ) = 1. Letter # occurs δ times in Y . For convenience, let us denote by μ (i ) the ith
occurrence of # in Y .
(III) We set τ = 2 and θ = δ − b.
(IV) Ghost(μ (i ),αi j ) = ci j and Sub(μ (i ),αi j ) = 1 −wi j . The functions are otherwise not defined.
This is clearly a polynomial-time reduction. We now prove the correspondence between a so-
lution SIMCK to the given instance IMCK and a solution SIMCSRk=1 to the instance IMCSRk=1 .
We first show that if SIMCK is a solution to IMCK, then SIMCSRk=1 is a solution to IMCSRk=1 . Since




j ∈Ci ci j · xi j , FreqY (αi j ) = 1, and τ = 2, the letters
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α1, . . . ,αδ corresponding to the selected elements lead to a Z that incurs a minimum∑
i ∈[1,δ ]
∑
j=μ (i ):FreqY (Z [j])<τ
FreqZ (Z [j])≥τ
Ghost(j,Z [j]). (2)
In addition, each letter Z [j] that is considered by the inner sum of Equation (2) corresponds to








i :Y [i]=#, FreqY (Z [i])<τ
FreqZ (Z [i])≥τ
Ghost(i,Z [i]) (3)
(i.e., condition I in Problem 4 is satisfied). Since the elements in SIMCK have total weight∑
i ∈[1,δ ]
∑




j ∈Ci (1 −




Sub(μ (i ),αi j ) · xi j =
∑
i :Y [i]=#
Sub(i,Z [i]) ≤ θ (4)
(i.e., condition II in Problem 4 is satisfied). SIMCSRk=1 is thus a solution to IMCSRk=1 .
We finally show that, if SIMCSRk=1 is a solution to IMCSRk=1 , then SIMCK is a solution to IMCK.
Since each #i , i ∈ [1,δ], is replaced by a single letter αi in SIMCSRk=1 , exactly one element will
be selected from each class Ci (i.e., conditions II-III of MCK are satisfied). Since the letters in
SIMCSRk=1 satisfy condition I of Problem 4, every element of Σ occurs exactly once in Y , and
τ = 2, their corresponding selected elements j1 ∈ C1, . . . , jδ ∈ Cδ will have a minimum total cost.
Since SIMCSRk=1 satisfies
∑




j ∈Ci Sub(μ (i ),αi j ) · xi j ≤ θ , the selected




j ∈Ci (1 −wi j ) ·




j ∈Ci wi j · xi j ≥ b (i.e., condition I of MCK is satisfied). There-
fore, SIMCK is a solution to IMCK. The statement follows. 
Lemma 6.1 implies the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.3. The MCSR problem is NP-hard.
The cost of τ -ghosts is captured by a function Ghost. This function assigns a cost to an occur-
rence of a τ -ghost, which is caused by a separator replacement at position i , and is specified based
on domain knowledge. For example, with a cost equal to 1 for each gained occurrence of each
τ -ghost, we penalize more heavily a τ -ghost with frequency much below τ in Y and the penalty
increases with the number of gained occurrences. Moreover, we may want to penalize positions
towards the end of a temporally ordered string, to avoid spurious patterns that would be deemed
important in applications based on time-decaying models [18].
The replacement distortion is captured by a function Sub, which assigns a weight to a letter that
could replace a # and is specified based on domain knowledge. The maximum allowable replace-
ment distortion is θ . Small weights favor the replacement of separators with desirable letters (e.g.,
letters that reinstate non-sensitive frequent patterns) and letters that reinstate sensitive patterns
are assigned a weight larger than θ that prohibits them from replacing a #. As will be explained
in Section 6.3, weights larger than θ are also assigned to letters which would lead to implausible
substrings [27] if they replaced #s.
6.2 MCSR-ALGO
We next present MCSR-ALGO, a non-trivial heuristic that exploits the connection of the MCSR
and MCK [40] problems. We start with a high-level description of MCSR-ALGO:
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(I) Construct the set of all candidate τ -ghost patterns (i.e., length-k strings over Σ with fre-
quency below τ in Y that can have frequency at least τ in Z ).
(II) Create an instance of MCK from an instance of MCSR. For this, we map the ith occurrence
of # to a classCi in MCK and each possible replacement of the occurrence with a letter j to
a different item in Ci . Specifically, we consider all possible replacements with letters in Σ
and also a replacement with the empty string, which models deleting (instead of replacing)
the ith occurrence of #. In addition, we set the costs and weights that are input to MCK as
follows. The cost for replacing the ith occurrence of # with the letter j is set to the sum of the
Ghost function for all candidate τ -ghost patterns when the ith occurrence of # is replaced
by j. That is, we make the worst-case assumption that the replacement forces all candidate
τ -ghosts to become τ -ghosts in Z . The weight for replacing the ith occurrence of # with
letter j is set to Sub(i, j ).
(III) Solve the instance of MCK and translate the solution back to a (possibly suboptimal) so-
lution of the MCSR problem. For this, we replace the ith occurrence of # with the letter
corresponding to the element chosen by the MCK algorithm from class Ci , and similarly
for each other occurrence of #. If the instance has no solution (i.e., no possible replacement
can hide the sensitive patterns), MCSR-ALGO reports that Z cannot be constructed and
terminates.
Lemma 6.2 below states the running time of an efficient implementation of MCSR-ALGO.
Lemma 6.2. MCSR-ALGO runs in O ( |Y | + kδσ + T (δ ,σ )) time, where T (δ ,σ ) is the running
time of the MCK algorithm for δ classes with σ + 1 elements each.
Proof. It should be clear that if we conceptually extend Σ with the empty string, our approach
takes into account the possibility of deleting (instead of replacing) an occurrence of #. To ease
comprehension though we only describe the case of letter replacements.
Step 1. Given Y , Σ, k , δ , and τ , we construct a set C of candidate τ -ghosts as follows. The candi-
dates are at most ( |Y | − k + 1 − kδ ) + (kδσ ) = O ( |Y | + kσδ ) distinct strings of length k . The first
term corresponds to all substrings of length k over Σ occurring in Y (i.e., if Y did not contain #,
we would have |Y | − k + 1 such substrings; each of the δ # causes the loss of k such substrings).
The second term corresponds to all possible substrings of length k that may be introduced in Z
but do not occur in Y . For any string U from the set of these O ( |Y | + kδσ ) strings, we want to
compute FreqY (U ) and its maximal frequency in Z , denoted by max FreqZ (U ), i.e., the largest pos-
sible frequency thatU can have in Z , to construct set C. Let Si j denote the string of length 2k − 1,
containing the k consecutive length-k substrings, obtained after replacing the ith occurrence of #
with letter j in Y .
(I) If FreqY (U ) ≥ τ , U by definition can never become τ -ghost in Z , and we thus exclude it
from C. FreqY (U ), for allU occurring in Y , can be computed in O ( |Y |) total time using the
suffix tree of Y [19].
(II) If max FreqZ (U ) < τ , U by definition can never become τ -ghost in Z , and we thus exclude
it from C. max FreqZ (U ) can be computed by adding to FreqY (U ), the maximum additional
number of occurrences ofU caused by a letter replacement among all possible letter replace-
ments. We sum up this quantity for each U and for all replacements of occurrences of # to
obtain max FreqZ (U ). To do this, we first build the generalized suffix tree of Y , S11, . . . , Sδ σ
in O ( |Y | + kδσ ) time [19]. We then spell Si1, . . . , Siσ , for all i , in the generalized suffix tree
in O (kσ ) time per i . We exploit suffix links to spell the length-k substrings of Si j in O (k )
time and memorize the maximum number of occurrences of U caused by replacing the ith
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occurrence of # among all j. We represent set C on the generalized suffix tree by marking
the corresponding nodes, and we denote this representation by T (C). The total size of this
representation is O ( |Y | + kσδ ).
Step 2. We now want to construct an instance of the MCK problem usingT (C). We first set letter
j as element αi j of class Ci . We then set ci j equal to the sum of the Ghost function cost incurred
by replacing the ith occurrence of # by letter j for all (at most k) affected length-k substrings that
are marked in T (C). The main assumption of our heuristic is precisely the fact that we assume
that this letter replacement will force all of these affected length-k substrings becoming τ -ghosts
in Z . The computation of ci j is done as follows. For each (i, j ), i ∈ [1,δ], and j ∈ [1,σ ], we have
k substrings whose frequency changes, each of length k . Let U be one such pattern occurring at
position t of Z , where μ (i ) − k + 1 ≤ t ≤ μ (i ) and μ (i ) is the ith occurrence of # in Y . We check if
U is marked inT (C) or not. IfU is not marked we add nothing to ci j . IfU is marked, we increment
ci j by Ghost(t ,U ). We also setwi j = Sub(i, j ) (as stated above, any letter that reinstates a sensitive
pattern is assigned a weight Sub > θ , so that it cannot be selected to replace an occurrence of # in
Step 3). Similar to Step 1, the total time required for this computation is O ( |Y | + kδσ ).
Step 3. In Step 2, we have computed ci j andwi j , for all i, j, i ∈ [1,δ] and j ∈ [1,σ ]. We thus have an
instance of the MCK problem. We solve it and translate the solution back to a (suboptimal) solution
of the MCSR problem: the element αi j chosen by the MCK algorithm from classCi corresponds to
letter j and it is used to replace the ith occurrence of #, for all i ∈ [1,δ]. The cost of solving MCK
depends on the chosen algorithm and is given by a function T (δ ,σ ).
Thus, the total cost of MCSR-ALGO is O ( |Y | + kδσ + T (δ ,σ )). 
6.3 Eliminating Implausible Patterns
We present the notion of implausible substring and explain how we can ensure that implausible
patterns do not occur in Z , as a result of applying the MCSR-ALGO algorithm to string Y .
Consider, for instance, an input string Y = . . . a#c . . . that models the movement of an individ-
ual, and the string abc, which is created as a substring of Z when we replace # with b. Consider
further that an individual can, generally, not go from a to c through b, or that it is highly unlikely
for them to do so. We call a substring such as abc implausible. Clearly, if abc occurs in Z , it may be
possible for an attacker to infer that b replaced #, and then infer a sensitive pattern by “undoing”
R1 as explained in Section 6.1. In order to effectively model this scenario, we define implausible
patterns based on a statistical significance measure for strings [7, 15, 42]. The measure is defined
as follows [15]:
zW (U ) =
FreqW (U ) − EW [U ]
max(
√
EW [U ], 1)
,
where U is a string with |U | > 2,W is the reference string, and




FreqW (U [0. . |U |−2]) ·FreqW (U [1. . |U |−1])
FreqW (U [1. . |U |−2]) , FreqW (U [1 . . |U | − 2]) > 0
0, otherwise
is the expected frequency of U in W , computed based on an independence assumption between
the event “U [0 . . |U | − 1] occurs in W ” and “U [1 . . |U | − 1] occurs in W .” The measure zW is a
normalized version of the standard score of U , based on the fact that the variance VarW [U ] ≈√
EW [U ] [42]. A small zW (U ) indicates that U occurs less likely than expected, and hence it can
naturally be considered as an artefact of sanitization.
Given a user-defined threshold ρ < 0, we define a string U as ρ-implausible if zW (U ) < ρ. The
set of ρ-implausible substrings of W can be computed in the optimal O ( |Σ| · |W |) time [7]. We
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useW as the reference string, assuming that it is a good representation of the domain; e.g., a trip
(substring) that is ρ-implausible in W is also implausible in general. Alternatively, one could use
any other string as reference, impose length constraints on implausible patterns [32, 47], or even
directly specify substrings that should not occur in Z based on domain knowledge.
Given the set U of (ρ-)implausible patterns, we ensure that no # replacement creates U =
U1αU2 ∈ U in Z , where α is the letter that replaces #, by assigning a weight Sub(i,Z [i]) > θ , for
each Z [i] such that Y [i] = # and U1 · Z [i] ·U2 ∈ U . This guarantees that no replacement leading
to an artefact occurrence of an element of U is performed by MCSR-ALGO. Note, however, that
a ρ-implausible pattern may occur in Z as a substring, either because it occurred in a part of W
that was copied to Z (e.g., a non-sensitive pattern), or due to the change of frequency of some
substrings that are created in Z after the replacement of a #. However, since such ρ-implausible
patterns did not contain a # in the first place, they cannot be exploited by an attacker seeking to
reverse the construction of Z .
7 ETFS-ALGO
Let U and V be two non-sensitive length-k substrings ofW such that U is the t-predecessor of V .
Since U and V must occur in the same order in the solution string XED, the main choice we have
to make in order to solve the ETFS problem is whether to:
(I) “merge”U andV when the length-(k − 1) suffix ofU and the length-(k − 1) prefix ofV match;
or
(II) “interleave” U and V with a carefully selected string over Σ ∪ {#}.
Among operations I and II, for every such pair U and V , we must select the operation that
globally results in the smallest number of edit operations. Operations I and II can naturally be
expressed by means of a regular expression E. In particular, this implies that any instance of the
ETFS problem can be reduced to an instance of approximate regular expression matching and thus
an algorithm for approximate regular expression matching between E andW [37] can be employed.
More formally, given a string W and a regular expression E, the approximate regular expression
matching problem is to find a stringT that matches E with minimal dE (W ,T ). The following result
is known.
Theorem 7.1 ([37]). Given a stringW and a regular expression E, the approximate regular expres-
sion matching problem can be solved in O ( |W | · |E |) time.
In the following, we define a specific type of a regular expression E. Let us first define the
following regular expression:
Σ<k = ((a1 |a2 | . . . |a |Σ | |ε ) . . . (a1 |a2 | . . . |a |Σ | |ε )︸︷︷︸
k − 1 times
),
where Σ = {a1,a2, . . . ,a |Σ | } is the alphabet ofW and k > 1. We also define the following regular-
expression gadgets, for a letter #  Σ:
⊕ = #(Σ<k #)∗,  = (Σ<k #)∗, ⊗ = (#Σ<k )∗.
Intuitively, the gadget ⊕ represents a string we may choose to include in the output in an effort
to minimize the edit distance between W and the solution string XED. It should be clear that the
length of ⊕ is in O (k |Σ|) and that ⊕ cannot generate any length-k substring over Σ. Furthermore,
inserting ⊕ in E cannot create any sensitive or non-sensitive pattern due to the occurrences of #
on both ends of ⊕. The gadgets  and ⊗ are similar to ⊕. They are added in the beginning and
at the end of E, respectively. This is because E should not start or end with # as this would only
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increase the edit distance toW . As it will be explained later, to construct E, we also make use of the
| operator. Intuitively, the | operator represents the choice we make between operation “merge” or
“interleave.”
We are now in a position to describe ETFS-ALGO, an algorithm for solving the ETFS prob-
lem. ETFS-ALGO starts by constructing E. Let (N1,N2 . . . ,N |I | ) be the sequence of non-sensitive
length-k substrings as they occur in W from left to right. We first set E = N1 and then process
the pairs of non-sensitive length-k substrings Ni and Ni+1, for all i ∈ {1, |I | − 1}. At the ith step,
we examine whether or not Ni and Ni+1 can be merged. If they can, we append to E a regular
expression (A| ⊕ Ni+1), whereA is obtained by chopping-off the length-(k − 1) prefix of Ni+1 (that
is, the remainder of Ni+1 after merging it with Ni ). Otherwise, we append ⊕Ni+1 to E. Intuitively,
using A corresponds to choosing “merge” and ⊕Ni+1 to choosing “interleave.” After examining
each pair Ni and Ni+1, we append ⊗ to E. This concludes the construction of E. Note how, for any
combination of choices, Ni+1 will always appear in the string obtained.
Next, ETFS-ALGO employs Theorem 7.1 to construct XED. In particular, it finds a string T that
matches E with minimaldE (W ,T ). Last, it setsXED = T . We arrive at the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.4. LetW be a string of length n over an alphabet Σ. Given k < n and S, ETFS-ALGO
solves Problem 3 in O (k |Σ|n2) time.
Proof. Constructing E can be done in O (n + kn + |E |) = O (k |Σ|n) time, since: (I) The non-
sensitive length-k substrings ofW can be obtained in O (n) time, by readingW from left to right
and checking S. (II) Checking whether Ni and Ni+1 are mergeable takes O (k ) time via letter com-
parisons, and it is performed in each of the O (n) steps. (III) The length is |E | = O (kn + k |Σ|n) =
O (k |Σ|n). This is because E contains at most n occurrences of non-sensitive length-k substrings,
at most n occurrences of ⊕, and one occurrence of each of  and ⊗ and because the lengths of ⊕,
 and ⊗ are O (k |Σ|).
Computing T from W and E can be performed in O ( |W | · |E |) = O (n · |E |) time using Theo-
rem 7.1. Thus ETFS-ALGO takes O (k |Σ|n2) time in total.
The correctness of ETFS-ALGO follows from the fact that by construction: (I)T does not contain
any sensitive pattern, so C1 is satisfied; (II) T satisfies P1 and P2 as no length-k substring over Σ
(other than the non-sensitive ones) is inserted in E; (III) All strings satisfying C1, P1, and P2 can
be obtained by E, since they must have the same t-chain of non-sensitive patterns over Σ∗ asW ,
interleaved by length-k substrings that are on (Σ ∪ #)∗ but not on Σ∗; and (IV) the minimality on
edit distance is guaranteed by Theorem 7.1. The statement follows. 
A factor of |Σ| can be shaved from O (k |Σ|n2) via dynamic programming [9], albeit it seems
unlikely to yield a strongly subquadratic time bound [8]. In any case, as our experiments show,
TFS-ALGO, which runs in O (kn) time, outputs optimal or near-optimal solutions in practice.
Example 7.2 (Illustration of the Workings of ETFS-ALGO). LetW = aaabbaabaccbbb, k = 4, and
the set of sensitive patterns be {aabb, abba, bbaa, baab, ccbb}. The sequence of non-sensitive
patterns is thus (N1, . . . ,N6) = (aaab, aaba, abac, bacc, accb, cbbb). Given that k = 4 and Σ =
{a, b, c}, ETFS-ALGO constructs the following gadgets,
⊕ = #(Σ<4#)∗ = #(((a|b|c|ε ) (a|b|c|ε ) (a|b|c|ε ))#)∗
 = (Σ<4#)∗ = (((a|b|c|ε ) (a|b|c|ε ) (a|b|c|ε ))#)∗
⊗ = (#Σ<4)∗ = (#((a|b|c|ε ) (a|b|c|ε ) (a|b|c|ε )))∗
and sets E = N1 = aaab. Then, it iterates over each pair of consecutive non-sensitive length-k
substrings in the order they appear in W (i.e., pair (Ni ,Ni+1) is considered in Step i ∈ [1, 5]) and
the regular expression E is updated, as detailed below.
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In Step 1, ETFS-ALGO considers the pair (N1,N2) = (aaab, aaba). Observe that in this case N1
and N2 can be merged, since the length-3 suffix of N1 and the length-3 prefix of N2 match. Thus,
(A|N2) = (a| ⊕ aaba) is appended to E. Recall that when merging, we chop off the length-(k − 1)
prefix of Ni+1 = N2 (because we have merged it already) and write down what is left of N2 (a in
this case) before |. Thus, E = aaab(a| ⊕ aaba).
In Step 2, ETFS-ALGO considers (N2,N3) = (aaba, abac). Again, N2 and N3 can be merged.
Thus, (c| ⊕ abac) is appended into E, which leads to E = aaab(a| ⊕ aaba) (c| ⊕ abac).
In Steps 3 and 4, ETFS-ALGO considers the pairs (N3,N4) = (abac, bacc) and (N4,N5) =
(bacc, accb), respectively. Since the patterns in each pair can be merged, the algorithm appends
into E the regular expression (c| ⊕ bacc) and (b| ⊕ accb), for the first and second pair, respectively.
This leads to E = aaab(a| ⊕ aaba) (c| ⊕ abac) (c| ⊕ bacc) (b| ⊕ accb).
In Step 5, ETFS-ALGO considers the last pair (N5,N6) = (accb, cbbb), which cannot be merged,
and appends ⊕cccb to E. Since there is no other pair to be considered, ⊗ is also appended to E,
leading to:
E = aaab(a|⊕aaba) (c| ⊕ abac) (c| ⊕ bacc) (b| ⊕ accb)⊕cbbb ⊗ .
At this point, ETFS-ALGO employs Theorem 7.1 to find the following stringT that matches E (the
choices that were made in the construction of T are underlined in E and , ⊕, ⊗ are matched by
the empty string):
T = aaab#aabaccb#cbbb,
with minimal dE (T ,W ) = 4. Last, ETFS-ALGO returns XED = T .
Note that XED = T in Example 7.2 does not contain any sensitive pattern and that all non-
sensitive patterns ofW appear inT in the same order and with the same frequency as they appear
in W . Note also that, for the same instance, TFS-ALGO would return string X =aaabaccb#cbbb
with dE (W ,X ) = 5 > dE (W ,XED) = 4 and |X | = 13 < |XED | = 17.
8 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate our algorithms in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness is measured based
on data utility and number of implausible patterns. Efficiency is measured based on runtime.
Evaluated Algorithms. First, we consider the pipeline TFS-ALGO→ PFS-ALGO→MCSR-ALGO,
referred to as TPM. Given a stringW over Σ, TPM sanitizesW by applying TFS-ALGO, PFS-ALGO,
and then MCSR-ALGO. MCSR-ALGO uses the O (δσθ )-time algorithm of [40] for solving the MCK
instances. The final output is a string Z over Σ. MCSR-ALGO is configured with an empty setU
(i.e., it may lead to implausible patterns that are created in Z after the replacement of a #).
Among the related works discussed in Section 2.1, we compared TPM against the PH heuris-
tic [27]. This is because we found PH to be the closest to our setting, and, moreover, because it
outperforms other related sequence sanitization methods [1, 25] (see Section 2.1 for details). We
also compared TPM against a greedy baseline referred to as BA, in terms of data utility and ef-
ficiency. BA initializes its output string ZBA to W and then considers each sensitive pattern R in
ZBA, from left to right. For each R, BA replaces the letter r of R that has the largest frequency in
ZBA with another letter r
′ that is not contained in R and has the smallest frequency in ZBA, break-
ing all ties arbitrarily. Note that this letter replacement should not introduce any other sensitive
pattern in ZBA. If no such r
′ exists, r is replaced by # to ensure that a solution is produced (even
if it may reveal the location of a sensitive pattern). Each replacement removes the occurrence of
R and aims to prevent τ -ghost occurrences by selecting an r ′ that will not substantially increase
the frequency of patterns overlapping with R. Note that BA does not preserve the frequency of
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Table 3. Characteristics of Datasets and Values Used (Default Values are in Bold)
Dataset Data domain Length Alphabet # sensitive # sensitive Pattern Implausible pat.
n size |Σ | patterns positions |S | length k threshold ρ
OLD Movement 85,563 100 [30, 240] (60) [600, 6103] [3, 7] (4) [−2, −0.1] (−1)
TRU Transportation 5,763 100 [30, 120] (10) [324, 2410] [2, 5] (4) [−3, −0.1] (−4)
MSN Web 4,698,764 17 [30, 120] (60) [6030, 320480] [3, 8] (4) [−6, −3] (−1)
DNA Genomic 4,641,652 4 [25, 500] (100) [163, 3488] [5, 15] (13) [−4.5, −2.5] (−2.5)
SYN Synthetic 20,000,000 10 [10, 1000] (1000) [10724, 20171] [3, 6] (6) -
SYNbin Synthetic 1,000 2 [4, 32] (16) [16, 128] [4, 7] (4) -
non-sensitive patterns, and thus, unlike TPM, it can incur τ -lost patterns. We also implemented a
similar baseline that replaces the letter in R that has the smallest frequency in ZBA with another
letter that is not contained in R and has the largest frequency in ZBA, but omit its results as it was
worse than BA.
In addition, we consider the pipelines TFS-ALGO→MCSR-ALGO and TFS-ALGO→MCSRI-
ALGO, referred to as TM and TMI, respectively. With MCSRI-ALGO we refer to the configuration
of MCSR in which there is a non-empty setU of ρ-implausible patterns that must not occur in the
output string Z . We omit PFS-ALGO from the TM and TMI pipelines to avoid the elimination of
some implausible patterns due to re-ordering of blocks of non-sensitive patterns that is performed
by PFS-ALGO.
Last, we consider ETFS-ALGO, which we compare to TFS-ALGO, to demonstrate that the latter
is a very effective heuristic for the ETFS problem.
Experimental Data. We considered the following publicly available datasets used in [1, 11, 25,
27, 31]: Oldenburg (OLD), Trucks (TRU), MSNBC (MSN), the complete genome of Escherichia coli
(DNA), and synthetic data (uniformly random strings, the largest of which is referred to as SYN).
See Table 3 for the characteristics of these datasets and the parameter values used in experiments,
unless stated otherwise.
Experimental Setup. The sensitive patterns were selected randomly among the frequent length-k
substrings at minimum support τ following [25, 27, 31]. We used the fairly low values (τ = 10 for
TRU, SYN, and SYNbin; τ = 20 for OLD and DNA; and τ = 200 for MSN), to have a wider selection
of sensitive patterns. In MCSR-ALGO, we used a uniform cost of 1 for every occurrence of each
τ -ghost, a weight of 1 (resp., ∞) for each letter replacement that does not (resp., does) create a
sensitive pattern, and we further set θ = δ . This setup treats all candidate τ -ghost patterns and all
candidate letters for replacement uniformly, to facilitate a fair comparison with BA which cannot
distinguish between τ -ghost candidates or favor specific letters. In MCSRI-ALGO, we instead set
a weight ∞ for each letter replacement that does not create a sensitive pattern or an implausible
pattern of length k .
In PH, we used a minimum frequency threshold of τ = 1 to ensure that sensitive patterns will
not occur as subsequences (and hence nor as substrings) in the output. We also transformed the
input string into a collection of strings and provided the collection as input to PH. This is be-
cause, although in principle PH can be applied to a single string, as in Example 2.1, this was not
possible for any of the datasets of Table 3. In fact, as it will be shown later, PH did not terminate
within 12 hours, even for very short strings of length 25 that took milliseconds to be sanitized by
our algorithms. The reason is that PH requires finding all occurrences of every sensitive pattern
in the string and computing changes to the set of non-sensitive frequent sequential patterns in-
curred by permutation and deletion. When τ = 1 and for reasonably long strings, this is a very
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computationally intensive task. This observation agrees with the findings in [27] and similar find-
ings were reported for other sanitization algorithms [1, 25].
Therefore, to be able to compare with PH, we converted a long string to a collection of short
strings (i.e., the type of dataset that PH was designed for). Specifically, we created a collection
of stringsW1,W2, . . . ,Wm from a string W , such thatW =W1 ·W2 · . . . ·Wm and |Wi | = r , for i ∈
[1,m], and then we applied PH to the collection. In our experiments, we varied r in [5, 25] and used
r = 15 as the default value. The smallest value r = 5 was selected to enable the hiding of sensitive
patterns of length k = 5 that we used; the largest value r = 25 was selected empirically. PH took
much longer as we increased r and did not terminate within 12 hours for r = 25. After applying
PH, we obtained a sanitized collection of strings W ′1 ,W
′
2 , . . . ,W
′
m and constructed a final string
I =W ′1 ·W ′2 · . . . ·W ′m by concatenating the strings in the sanitized collection. Note that we favor
PH by neglecting the possibility that sensitive patterns may be created when concatenating the
strings in the sanitized collection.
To capture the utility of sanitized data, we used the (frequency) distortion measure
∑
U
(FreqW (U ) − FreqZ (U ))2,
where U ∈ Σk is a non-sensitive pattern. The distortion measure quantifies changes in the fre-
quency of non-sensitive patterns with low values suggesting that Z remains useful for tasks based
on pattern frequency (e.g., identifying motifs corresponding to functional or conserved DNA [41]).
We also measured the number of τ -ghost and τ -lost patterns in Z following [25, 27, 31], where
a pattern U is τ−lost in Z if and only if FreqW (U ) ≥ τ but FreqZ (U ) < τ . That is, τ -lost patterns
model knowledge that can no longer be mined from Z but could be mined from W , whereas τ -
ghost patterns model knowledge that can be mined from Z but not from W . A small number
of τ -lost/ghost patterns suggests that frequent pattern mining can be accurately performed on
Z [25, 27, 31]. Unlike BA, by design TPM does not incur any τ -lost pattern, as TFS-ALGO and PFS-
ALGO preserve frequencies of non-sensitive patterns, and MCSR-ALGO can only increase pattern
frequencies.
To examine the benefit of using MCSRI-ALGO instead of MCSR-ALGO when implausible pat-
terns need to be eliminated, we measured the percentage of ρ-implausible patterns of length k that
may occur inZ , when a letter replaces a #. Clearly, the percentage is 0 when MCSRI-ALGO is used,
and a large percentage for MCSR-ALGO implies that it is beneficial to use MCSRI-ALGO instead.
To capture the effectiveness of TFS-ALGO in terms of constructing a string X that is at small
edit distance fromW (see the ETFS problem), we used the Edit Distance Relative Error, defined as
dE (W ,X ) − dE (W ,XED)
dE (W ,XED)
.
All experiments ran on a Desktop PC with an Intel Xeon E5-2640 at 2.66GHz and 16GB RAM.
Our source code is written in C++ and is accessible from https://bitbucket.org/stringsanitization/
stringsanitizationtkdd/. The code for PH is also written in C++ and was provided by the authors
of [27]. The results presented below have been averaged over 10 runs.
8.1 TPM vs. PH
Data Utility. We first demonstrate that TPM substantially outperformed PH in terms of distor-
tion. This suggests that TPM is a much better method for preserving utility in tasks based on the
frequency of substrings (e.g., [41]). Figure 2(a) shows that, for varying number of sensitive pat-
terns, TPM incurred on average 477 (and up to 1,045) times lower distortion than PH did. These
results are expected because PH applies permutation and/or deletion to eliminate all occurrences
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Fig. 2. Distortion vs. (a) number of sensitive patterns and their total number |S| of occurrences inW (first
two lines on the X axis), and (b) length of sensitive patterns k (and |S|). Total number of τ -lost and τ -ghost
patterns vs. (c) length of sensitive patterns k , and (d) length of sensitive patterns k (and |S|). xy on the top of
each bar denotes x τ -lost and y τ -ghost patterns.
Fig. 3. (a) Runtime, (b) distortion, and (c) total number of τ -lost and τ -ghost patterns vs. length of the records
of the input dataset to PH. Note that PH did not terminate within 12 hours when r = 25.
of a sensitive pattern as a subsequence from the sanitized output, whereas only the occurrences
in which the pattern is comprised of consecutive letters (i.e., the sensitive pattern occurs as a sub-
string) should be eliminated. This “overprotection” incurs distortion unnecessarily and severely
harms utility, particularly when there are more sensitive patterns. Indeed, Figure 2(a) shows that
PH becomes less effective as the number of sensitive patterns increases. In addition, TPM incurred
substantially less distortion than PH for all tested values of k . Figure 2(b) shows that TPM incurred
on average 78 (and up to 169) times lower distortion than PH. This is again because our setting
calls for hiding occurrences of sensitive patterns as substrings and, in this setting, PH overprotects
data unnecessarily.
We now demonstrate that TPM allows substantially more accurate frequent substring mining
than PH. Figure 2(c) shows that, for varying number of sensitive patterns, the number of τ -lost
and τ -ghost patterns for TPM was on average 376 (and up to 586 times) lower compared to that
of PH. Quantitatively similar results were obtained for varying k , as can be seen in Figure 2(d).
Specifically, the number of τ -lost and τ -ghost patterns for TPM was at least 21 (and up to 234)
times lower than that of PH. Note that TPM creates no τ -lost patterns by design and it created no
more than 2 τ -ghost patterns in the experiments of Figure 2(d), while PH created up to 234 τ -lost
and 1107 τ -ghost patterns.
Impact of r on Efficiency. We demonstrate the runtime of PH as a function of r , the length of
records in the collection of recordsW1,W2, . . . ,Wm that was created from a string datasetW and
given as input to PH. As can be seen in Figure 3(a), the runtime of PH increased from 4 seconds
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Fig. 4. Distortion vs. number of sensitive patterns and their total number |S| of occurrences inW (first two
lines on the X axis).
when r = 5 to 2.5 hours when r = 20. Also, PH did not terminate within 12 hours for r = 25. This
shows why it was not feasible to apply PH directly to an entire string dataset of Table 3, and
we needed to construct a collection of sequences instead. As mentioned in “Experimental setup”
above, the reason is that PH needs much time to hide all occurrences of sensitive patterns as
subsequences for large strings, particularly when τ = 1, which is needed to reduce the frequency
of sensitive patterns (substrings) to zero. On the other hand, TPM required less than a second to
processW . Note that the results reported for TPM are the same for all values of r , because r is not
an input parameter to TPM.
Impact of r on Data Utility. We demonstrate that TPM substantially outperforms PH, for all tested
values of r , both in terms of distortion and number of τ -lost and τ -ghost patterns. Specifically,
TPM incurred on average 169 (and up to 201) times lower distortion than PH. Also, it created
only 1 τ -lost pattern, while PH created at least 29 τ -lost and 421 τ -ghost patterns. The reason that
PH gets worse when r increases is because a longer record implies that there are generally more
occurrences of sensitive patterns (as subsequences) that PH needs to hide, and this requires more
substantial changes to the input data. Note that the results reported for TPM are the same for all
values of r , because r is not an input parameter to TPM.
8.2 TPM vs. BA
Data Utility. We first demonstrate that TPM incurs very low distortion. Figure 4 shows that, for
varying number of sensitive patterns, TPM incurred on average 18.4 (and up to 95) times lower
distortion than BA over all experiments. Also, Figure 4 shows that TPM remains effective even in
challenging settings, with many sensitive patterns (e.g., the last point in Figure 4(b) where about
42% of the positions inW are sensitive). Figure 5 shows that, for varying k , TPM caused on average
7.6 (and up to 14) times lower distortion than BA over all experiments.
Next, we demonstrate that TPM permits accurate frequent pattern mining: Figure 6 shows that
TPM led to no τ -lost or τ -ghost patterns for the TRU and MSN datasets. This implies no utility loss
for mining frequent length-k substrings with threshold τ . In all other cases, the number of τ -ghosts
was on average 6 (and up to 12) times smaller than the total number of τ -lost and τ -ghost patterns
for BA. BA performed poorly (e.g., up to 44% of frequent patterns became τ -lost for TRU and 27%
for DNA). Figure 7 shows that, for varying k , TPM led to on average 5.8 (and up to 19) times fewer
τ -lost/ghost patterns than BA. BA performed poorly (e.g., up to 98% of frequent patterns became
τ -lost for DNA).
We also demonstrate that PFS-ALGO reduces the length of the output string X of TFS-ALGO
substantially, creating a string Y that contains less redundant information and allows for more
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Fig. 5. Distortion vs. length of sensitive patterns k (and |S|).
Fig. 6. Total number of τ -lost and τ -ghost patterns vs. number of sensitive patterns (and |S|). xy on the top
of each bar for BA denotes x τ -lost and y τ -ghost patterns.
Fig. 7. Total number of τ -lost and τ -ghost patterns vs. length of sensitive patterns k (and |S|). xy on the top
of each bar for BA denotes x τ -lost and y τ -ghost patterns.
efficient analysis. Figure 8(a) shows the length of X and of Y and their difference for k = 5. Y
was much shorter than X and its length decreased with the number of sensitive patterns, since
more substrings had a suffix–prefix overlap of length k − 1 = 4 and were removed (see Section 5).
Interestingly, the length of Y was close to that ofW (the string before sanitization). A larger k led
to less substantial length reduction as shown in Figure 8(b) (but still few thousand letters were
removed), since it is less likely for long substrings of sensitive patterns to have an overlap and be
removed.
Efficiency. We finally measured the runtime of TPM using prefixes of the synthetic string SYN
whose length n is 20 million letters. Figure 8(c) (resp., Figure 8(d)) shows that TPM scaled linearly
with n (resp., k), as predicted by our analysis in Section 6 (TPM takes O (n + |Y | + kδσ + δσθ ) =
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Fig. 8. Length of X and Y (output of TFS-ALGO and PFS-ALGO, respectively) for varying: (a) number of
sensitive patterns (and |S|), and (b) length of sensitive patterns k (and |S|). On the top of each pair of bars
we plot |X | − |Y |. Runtime on synthetic data for varying: (c) length n of string and (d) length k of sensitive
patterns. Note that |Y | = |Z |.
O (kn + kδσ + δσθ ) time, since the algorithm of [40] was used for MCK instances). In addition,
TPM is efficient, with a runtime similar to that of BA and less than 40 seconds for SYN.
8.3 TM vs. TMI
We compare TM with TMI based on data utility and the number of implausible patterns incurred.
The objective of these experiments is to show that TMI is able to produce a string Z that does not
contain implausible patterns, while being comparable to TM in terms of the amount of distortion
and number of ghost patterns incurred.
We do not report the results of comparing TM with TMI in terms of efficiency, because the
runtime of TMI was almost identical to that of TM.
Impact of |S|. We first demonstrate that many implausible patterns may occur as a result of
replacing #s with letters, when MCSR is used. This can be seen from Figure 9(a)–9(c), which shows
the percentage of implausible patterns incurred by TM, for varying |S| in OLD, TRU, and MSN,
respectively. The percentage is on average 33.08% (and up to 35.63%). The percentage for DNA is
0% (omitted), because this dataset has a very small alphabet size. Thus, in this experiment, MCSR-
ALGO and MCSRI-ALGO are essentially the same algorithm. Since TMI is guaranteed to eliminate
implausible patterns, its corresponding percentages are zero (omitted).
We then demonstrate that TMI eliminates implausible patterns without incurring substantial
utility loss compared to TM. Figures 10 and 11 show that TMI incurred a comparable amount of
distortion to TM. Specifically, TMI incurred 8% and 1% less distortion in the case of OLD and TRU
datasets and 37% more distortion in the case of MSN. TMI also incurred a similar number of ghosts
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Fig. 9. Percentage of implausible patterns vs. number of sensitive patterns (and |S|). The percentages of
implausible patterns for DNA are all 0%.
Fig. 10. Distortion vs. number of sensitive patterns and their total number |S| of occurrences inW (first two
lines on the X axis).
Fig. 11. Number of τ -ghost patterns (the number of τ -lost patterns is zero by design) vs. number of sensitive
patterns (and |S|). The number of τ -ghost patterns for OLD is 0.
than TM. Specifically, TMI incurred 7.1% fewer ghosts in the case of TRU and 54% more ghosts in
the case of MSN. Note that no τ -ghost patterns were incurred in the case of OLD (for both TM and
TMI). The worse performance of TMI in the case of the MSN dataset is attributed to its relatively
small alphabet size, which makes it more difficult to select a letter replacement that does not incur
implausible patterns.
Impact of k . Figure 12(a) shows that the percentage of implausible patterns incurred by TM for
the OLD dataset was on average 4.3% (and up to 9.6%). Again, this confirms the need to eliminate
implausible patterns in practice. The results for TRU, MSN, and DNA are qualitatively similar and
omitted from all remaining experiments.
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Fig. 12. (a) Percentage of implausible patterns vs. k (and |S|). (b) Distortion vs. k (and |S|). (c) Number of
τ -ghost patterns vs. k (and |S|).
Fig. 13. (a) Distortion, (b) number of τ -ghost patterns, and (c) percentage of implausible patterns vs. ρ.
We now demonstrate that TMI eliminates implausible patterns, while incurring a comparable
amount of distortion and ghosts (on average) compared to TM. Specifically, the distortion for TMI
was 17% lower than TM on average (see Figure 12(b)), and the number of τ -ghost patterns for TMI
was 16.2% lower on average (see Figure 12(c)).
Impact of ρ. We demonstrate that TMI can eliminate implausible patterns, while preserving data
utility as well as TM does. This can be seen from Figure 13(a), which shows that the percentage of
implausible patterns incurred by TM was 4.1% on average (and up to 5.3%), and from Figures 13(b)
and 13(c), which show that TMI caused on average 19.5% lower distortion and 9.4% fewer τ -ghosts,
respectively, compared to TM.
8.4 TFS-ALGO vs. ETFS-ALGO
We demonstrate that TFS-ALGO is a very effective heuristic for the ETFS problem. Specifically, it
constructs a string X that is either an optimal solution to the problem or it is at slightly larger edit
distance from W compared to the exact solution string XED that is constructed by ETFS-ALGO.
This can be seen from Figure 14(a) (resp., Figure 14(b)), which shows that TFS-ALGO constructed
optimal solutions (i.e., Edit Distance Relative Error was 0) in 98% (resp., 93%) of the tested strings,
on average. These strings are uniformly random and have the same length and alphabet as SYNbin.
Qualitatively similar results were obtained for uniformly random strings of different lengths and
alphabet sizes (omitted). In addition, the effectiveness of TFS-ALGO can be seen from Figures 14(c)
and 14(d), which show that the Edit Distance Relative Error in TRU was no more than 2.8%. These
results are encouraging because, unlike ETFS-ALGO, TFS-ALGO is applicable to large strings such
as OLD, MSN, and DNA (recall that its time complexity is linear instead of quadratic in |W |).
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Fig. 14. Edit Distance Relative Error vs. (a) k (and |S|), and (b) number of sensitive patterns (and |S|) for
each of the 50,000 random strings. Edit Distance Relative Error vs. (c) k (and |S|), and (d) number of sensitive
patterns (and |S|) for TRU.
9 CONCLUSION
In this article, we introduced the CSD model. The focus of this model is on guaranteeing privacy-
utility trade-offs in sequential data (e.g., C1 vs. Π1 and P2).
Under this model, we considered two different settings. The common privacy constraint in both
settings is that the output string must not contain any sensitive pattern. In the first setting, we aim
to generate the minimal-length string that preserves the order of appearance and the frequency of
all non-sensitive patterns. We defined a problem, TFS, to capture these requirements, and a vari-
ant of it, PFS, that preserves a partial order and the frequency of the non-sensitive patterns but
generally produces a shorter string. We developed two time-optimal algorithms, TFS-ALGO and
PFS-ALGO, for TFS and PFS, respectively. We also developed MCSR-ALGO, a heuristic that pre-
vents the disclosure of the location of sensitive patterns, ensuring that sensitive patterns are not
reinstated, implausible patterns are not introduced, and occurrences of spurious patterns are pre-
vented from the outputs of TFS-ALGO and PFS-ALGO. In the second setting, we aim to generate
a string that is at MED from the original string, in addition to preserving the order of appearance
and the frequency of all non-sensitive patterns. We defined a problem, ETFS, to capture these re-
quirements, and proposed ETFS-ALGO, an algorithm, which is based on solving specific instances
of approximate regular expression matching, to construct such a string.
Our experiments show that string sanitization by TFS-ALGO, PFS-ALGO, and then MCSR-
ALGO is both effective and efficient. They also demonstrate that TFS-ALGO can be employed as
an effective heuristic to the ETFS problem producing optimal or near-optimal solutions in practice.
We leave the following question unanswered: Given a string X containing #s, a positive integer
k , and a positive integer τ , how should we replace the #s in X with letters in Σ, so that the number
of distinct length-k τ -ghosts in the resulting string Z is minimized?
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